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Article
Introduction
Governments create the political and economic environment 
in which their countries’ businesses have to operate, usually 
described as the “enabling environment” or “investment cli-
mate.” In response, business associations seek to influence 
public policy to make it easier for their members to “do 
business.”
There is a desire in multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank and International Finance Corporation to 
improve the enabling environment. That is why, since 2003, 
the World Bank has been publishing Doing Business reports, 
which rank most countries on a number of investment cli-
mate factors and give an overall rank of the “ease of doing 
business.” This has encouraged governments to recognize 
that improving the enabling environment can make an enor-
mous difference to whether they have a vibrant private sector 
and to the rate of economic growth. Donors consider this 
approach so important that the Donor Committee for 
Enterprise Development guidance manual (White, 2008) 
stresses that
reforming the business environment is a priority for development 
agencies and governments because of the significant influence 
the business environment has on the development of the private 
sector and therefore on economic growth and the generation of 
livelihoods and jobs. (p. 3)
They recognize the need to involve the private sector in 
reform and go further, saying that they aim to build the 
capacity of the private sector to influence public policy 
(White, 2008).
In sub-Saharan Africa, there are now six advocacy sup-
port programs aiming, inter alia, to assist business member-
ship organizations (BMOs) to advocate change in public 
policy. In Kenya, the Business Advocacy Fund (BAF), 
largely funded by Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA), provides financial and capacity building sup-
port. In its first phase, lasting from 2006 to 2010, BAF 
awarded 58 grants totaling US$1.2m to 37 BMOs to finance 
advocacy activities (BAF, 2013). A second phase lasts from 
2011 to 2015. (Tanzania has Business Environment 
Strengthening for Tanzania—Dialogue; Ghana has the 
Business Sector Advocacy Challenge Fund; Nigeria has 
Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy for a Better Business 
Environment (ENABLE) ; Mozambique has Fundo para 
Ambiente de Negócios; and Zimbisa has recently been 
launched in Zimbabwe.)
There is a belief among some researchers, however, 
including Useem (1984), that it is not business associations 
but rather key individuals from the private sector’s “inner 
circle” who make things happen. Useem does acknowledge 
that this is often on behalf of the wider business community 
but, au contraire, suggests that business people use their net-
works and influence to seek competitive advantage.
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It has been suggested that business leaders—insofar as they are able to exert influence over public policy—do so through 
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The Hon. Gerald Ssendaula is perhaps typical of the inner 
circle that Useem has in mind. In early 2012, he was elected 
Chairman of the East Africa Business Council (EABC). As 
EABC puts it (A. Nderitu, [then] CEO, East Africa Business 
Council, Arusha, personal communication, March 24, 2012), 
he brings a wealth of experience, having worked with both 
the public and private sectors for several years. He headed 
several ministries in Uganda during his time in government, 
including the Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Finance, 
Planning, and Economic Planning. He is now a businessman, 
with interests in coffee farming, hospitality industry, real 
estate, and general trading. He is Chairman of Tropical Bank, 
Uganda, Chairman of the Coffee Farmers’ Association, 
Chairman of the national apex Uganda Private Sector 
Foundation, and Chairman of the Uganda Revenue Authority. 
He is also a senior Presidential Advisor on finance matters.
There are also people who started in business and then 
became involved in influencing government. Manu 
Chandaria, for example, a successful businessman in Kenya 
established his own, very successful, business. He has been 
appointed to the board of a number of other private compa-
nies. He has also been appointed, at different times, to a large 
number of government committees and task forces. He is a 
former chairman of the Kenya Association of Manufacturers 
(KAM) and was founding chairman of both the Kenya 
Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) and the regional EABC. 
Unlike many business people, who prefer to keep a lower 
profile, Chandaria (2008) has helpfully provided a detailed 
biography on the Internet (Chandaria, 2008).
His key appointments—in private companies, business 
association, and government committees—are summarized 
in Figure 1. As can be seen, he is widely networked and has 
(or had) the confidence of political leaders who appointed 
him to a number of public sector and parastatal 
organizations.
Another private sector leader, Vimal Shah, is CEO of the 
Bidco Group, which he has grown from being small and 
unknown to one of East Africa’s most respected manufactur-
ing companies, with manufacturing operations in Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanzania. He is a former chairman of KAM and 
currently chairman of KEPSA. He is chairman of EABC’s 
Trade and Investment Committee. He is a board member of 
United States International University of Kenya and the 
Kenya Polytechnic University College and a member of the 
Presidential Investors’ Round Table of Uganda.
None of these people appear to have political ambitions, 
perhaps believing that they can achieve more by keeping out 
of politics, though a former chairman of KEPSA has seen the 
Figure 1. Manu Chandaria: Networks.
Source. Chandaria (2008) biographical note.
Note. Manu Chandaria is (or was) a director of the companies (at the top of the graphic), the business associations (in the middle of the graphic) and 
public sector organisations and committees (at the bottom).
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chairmanship as a useful stepping stone into the limelight in 
the hope of moving into a political career. If governments are 
serious about improving the enabling environment, they 
need to talk to business leaders and are often keen, for rea-
sons including respectability and legitimacy, to recruit busi-
ness leaders to working groups, advisory committees, boards, 
and so on. In addition, however, government talks regularly 
to key business associations. If a few business leaders with 
good networks could make a significant difference, it would 
obviate the need for business associations and the donors 
providing them with financial support might question 
whether it was worth providing. One possible indicator of 
close relationships between a small number of business lead-
ers and public sector policy makers might be the appoint-
ment of a small number of influential business leaders to 
public bodies.
In some countries, such as the United States, companies 
may well join business associations to exert influence on 
government but many also resort to the use of lobbyists who 
can work on their behalf. In Kenya, there seem to be very 
few lobbyists. Asking around the BMOs produced just two 
names. Keli Kiilu runs Corporate Regulatory Solutions, 
based in Kenya. He previously worked for British American 
Tobacco rising to take charge of their African division. He 
has high-level contacts among the political class in Kenya, 
Uganda, and Tanzania. He does not lobby overtly (and does 
not have a website), but businesses engage him to take for-
ward a certain agenda with high-level government persons. 
He is a director at EABC and has been a director at KAM and 
KEPSA, among others. Kiriro wa Ngugi, a former Member 
of Parliament (MP), runs Lobbying Associates. This lack of 
lobbyists might imply less effort by businesses to influence 
public policy, or that businesses work through associations, 
or that businesses simply rely on their own networks of 
contacts.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: The next 
section reviews the literature on business association objec-
tives and their approach to advocacy, including how they 
access policy makers, and sets out the research question; the 
following section describes the research and the data; the 
penultimate section explores the findings; the article ends 
with the conclusion that business associations, at least in 
Kenya, have much more influence than individuals.
The Literature
Pluralists assert that democratic politics is less about domi-
nation by elites and more about small groups, with particular 
interests and which are politically autonomous, seeking to 
influence policy. The assumption is that good policy emerges 
from the arguments of groups with contradictory positions. 
This led Truman (1951) to argue that when individuals care 
enough about public policy, interest groups will emerge and 
seek to influence that policy. As explained by Gilens and 
Page (2014), views of pluralism divide into majoritarian, in 
which all citizens’ interests are represented, and biased, in 
which the views of business and professional interest groups 
prevail. An interest group is simply an “organised body of 
individuals who share some goals and try to influence pol-
icy” (Berry, 1984, p. 4). This article, however, takes a nar-
rower view, focusing on business associations which 
“aggregate the collective power and interests of the private 
sector” (Heilman & Lucas, 1997, p. 142) in an effort to influ-
ence public policy. They are membership organizations 
rather than campaign groups or pressure groups and often 
offer other services to their members in addition to represent-
ing them in public policy debates. Gilens and Page (2014) 
assert that economic elites and business interest groups are 
more influential, at least in the United States, than are mass 
member groups or individual citizens.
It is important to ask why businesses and business asso-
ciations might want to influence policy. Ridley (2010), quot-
ing Milton Friedman, observes
that “business corporations in general are not defenders of free 
enterprise. On the contrary, they are one of the chief sources of 
danger.” They are addicted to corporate welfare, they love 
regulations that erect barriers to entry to their small competitors, 
they yearn for monopoly and they grow flabby and inefficient 
with age. (p. 111)
Some suggest that interest groups which seek to influence 
narrow areas of policy may be a threat to the democratic pro-
cess (Beyers, Eising, & Maloney, 2008). However, politi-
cians and officials will have interests of their own and may 
seek support from interest groups (Beyers et al., 2008) to 
bolster their position. Indeed, Dür and Mateo (2012) argue 
that business associations’ ability to provide information and 
expertise should confer access to political institutions that 
need these resources. Lowery and Gray (2004) assert that 
“the formation and operation of organised interests supports 
rather than undermines the effective operation of democratic 
government” (p. 165). Dür and De Bièvre (2007) support the 
view that interest group participation in policy making can 
improve public sector decision making. Saurugger (2008) 
asserts that participatory democracy requires widespread 
participation in policy formulation and that interest groups 
(rather than individual citizens) provide knowledge and 
expertise to policy makers and broaden citizen involvement. 
Dür and Mateo (2012) suggest, at least in relation to the EU, 
that interest group participation, bringing a range of voices 
and expertise, enhances the legitimacy and quality of policy 
making. Business associations can thus make a big differ-
ence (Baumgartner et al., 2009). These views support the 
idea of the existence of a resource exchange relationship 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Dür & Mateo, 2012; Salisbury, 
1969; Streeck & Schmitter, 1985; Walker, 1983), in which 
interest groups offer policy makers expertise, knowledge, 
information, and legitimacy in exchange for the delivery of 
public policy acceptable to the interest groups. This perhaps 
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begs a question, however, about whether interest groups are 
seeking a public good (on behalf of all business) or a selec-
tive good (on behalf of their members alone).
Walker (1991) differentiated between groups which 
adopted a strategy of working inside government—and seek-
ing directly to influence officials and politicians—and an out-
side strategy—essentially mobilizing public opinion. He 
notes that business leaders get privileged access to govern-
ment and so prefer to operate inside and out of public view. It 
is not clear, however, whether they get that access by virtue of 
being business leaders or by earning it through their associa-
tions’ demonstration of credibility and competence. However, 
he argues that interest groups “wield significant influence” (p. 
7) in the policy-making process and that it is shared interests 
about public policies that lead businesses to create associa-
tions. He observes that the public sector often encourages the 
formation of a group because they need an appropriate orga-
nization with whom to consult (Walker, 1983).
There are a number of broad approaches that associations 
can adopt when attempting to influence public policy and a 
wide range of tools and techniques. The term advocacy is 
sometimes used to describe all attempts to influence govern-
ment. Sometimes, it is used synonymously with “lobbying.” 
However, “lobbying” is generally only used to describe spe-
cific attempts to influence policy through face-to-face or 
written communication with the driving force being the asso-
ciation or interest group (see Figure 2). Dür and Mateo 
(2013) suggest that the choice of strategy depends on group 
type, with business associations being more likely to pursue 
a strategy of insider lobbying and citizen groups and profes-
sional associations being more likely to pursue an outsider 
strategy. Eising (2007) stresses that “access is not equal to 
influence” (p. 332), though access is a sine qua non to be able 
to influence. He suggests that access depends not only on 
group type, which he acknowledges, but also on institutional 
context and resource dependence.
The East African Community has enshrined the need to 
consult with private sector and civil society in its treaty. 
There is not the same legal requirement in the member states 
but there is an increasing desire in many governments, 
including the Government of Kenya, to consult. In the EU 
and United States, there is a recognition by public officials 
that interest groups can provide information and evidence 
that will help them do their job; in exchange, business asso-
ciations are able, at least to some extent, to influence policy 
(Eising, 2007). So, all parties benefit. There is a bigger 
resource issue for business associations, in that groups that 
are continuously in touch with officials are likely to be better 
informed about policy making (Eising, 2007) and thus better 
positioned to feedback views and ultimately to influence the 
policy making.
Arguably, the most effective approach to influencing pub-
lic policy is dialogue. This presupposes that an association 
has sufficient evidence to support its policy position. 
Dialogue is predicated on a process of partnership and col-
laboration. Partners in a genuine dialogue will work hard to 
understand the position from where the other is coming, so 
partners will tend to look for solutions that satisfy all parties. 
Because dialogue is face to face, it is possible for those rep-
resenting business associations to promote narrow interests, 
though there is not too much evidence of this happening. The 
alternative to using evidence-based argument is to base 
Figure 2. Approaches to policy influence.
Source. Adapted from an original idea by Start and Hovland (2004).
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arguments on interests or values. Organizations might resort 
to this approach for any of several reasons: They find that 
they are getting nowhere with their evidence-based argu-
ments; there may be no evidence or a lack of understanding 
of the evidence, or they may not trust the evidence; or, they 
may not like what the evidence appears to be saying. 
Sometimes, organizations will engage in direct action. Too 
often, though not always, this manifests itself in behavior 
perceived by most of the population to be unacceptable. The 
last option is the “special pleading” beloved of large corpo-
rates, especially when they are well connected to the political 
elite. Corporates typically engage in such behavior because 
they are rent seeking, perhaps looking for protection from 
foreign competition or subsidies for inputs.
Useem (1984) argues that it is not business associations 
that make things happen:
Rarely if ever does big business act collectively to promote its 
political interests, classwide or otherwise, for as a bloc it lacks 
even the most rudimentary means for identifying and agreeing 
on its common needs, let alone a vehicle for pursuing them. The 
inner circle, by contrast, is opportunely situated to overcome 
these lacks . . . it possesses the parochial interests of single 
companies and sectors and to offer a more integrated vision of 
the broader, longer-term needs of business. (p. 59)
He argues that
the inner circle’s ability to mobilize political resources is 
embraced to the extent that it is more socially cohesive than the 
rest of corporate management . . . while social cohesion is not 
necessarily a precondition for mobilization, it is a power 
facilitator. (p. 63)
Useem effectively argues that there is an inner circle of 
elite business leaders, that the inner circle has access to polit-
ical leaders, and that the inner circle influences public policy 
in a way that lacks legitimacy, transparency, and account-
ability. This view is countered by Bernhagen (2013) whose 
research suggests that lobbyists find it difficult to influence 
policy makers to act in the interests of the lobbyist “at the 
expense of wider constituencies” (p. 20).
There are clearly a number of people, such as Chandaria 
and Kiilu, with well-developed networks and with easy 
access to political leaders. There are also business leaders 
who support politicians and political candidates, presumably 
in part, at least, to increase access and influence behind 
closed doors, including seeking competitive advantage and 
government contracts. Isaac Awondo, for example, is manag-
ing director of the Commercial Bank of Africa, owned by the 
Kenyatta family. He acted as campaign manager for the suc-
cessful candidate for Nairobi County Governor (though, 
curiously, the Governor is in the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM), rather than Kenyatta’s Jubilee coalition). 
Many politicians have set up successful businesses, possibly 
using their political connections to gain competitive 
advantage. What is less clear is the extent to which business 
leaders who do not represent associations are able actually to 
influence policy. Business associations confer legitimacy 
both to the leaders who have an argument to make and to 
policy makers who can point to the spread of support for a 
particular issue.
Useem (1984) says that a small number of firms “have 
come to exercise a voice on behalf of the entire business 
community” (p. 3). Bennett (1998) interprets this to mean 
that those few firms will exert a disproportionate role in gov-
ernment committees, in the governance of business associa-
tions, and in the media. He suggests that large firms might 
lobby for competitive advantage but also that they will join 
associations “to gain wider legitimacy” (Bennett, 1998).
This raises a number of questions:
•• Research Question 1: Will business leaders, when 
they have the chance, join and work through business 
associations or will they simply use their personal 
contacts?
•• Research Question 2: Will business leaders who are 
exploiting personal contacts act on behalf of the pri-
vate sector in general or will they be more likely to 
seek competitive advantage for their own business?
•• Research Question 3: Can business associations 
make a difference or is their effort effectively wasted?
•• Research Question 4: Can business associations 
develop their own networks and relationships which 
can increase their chances of influencing public 
policy?
One of the challenges of looking for evidence of an “inner 
circle” is that personal connections may be down to who 
went to school with whom or membership of the golf club. 
Unless large sums of money are changing hands, influencing 
public policy will require more than simply knowing the 
minister’s private telephone number. If legitimacy is impor-
tant, however, we might then expect that these business lead-
ers are appointed to the boards of appropriate public bodies, 
so that they have a more formal voice. We might also find 
them seeking to promote their vested interests through taking 
positions of leadership in key interest groups. The hypothe-
sis, then, is that an inner circle which is large enough to make 
a difference will be manifested in a small group of business 
people who are appointed to the boards of public agencies 
and elected to the boards of business associations.
The Research
The objective of the research, therefore, was to identify the 
people who sit on boards of large companies, government 
agencies (typically in the United Kingdom known as quan-
gos but known in Kenya as parastatal organizations), and 
business associations and then to explore the extent of mul-
tiple appointments.
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The method adopted was to research the membership of 
boards through Internet search and telephone calls. This was 
supplemented by key informant interviews. The research 
aimed:
•• to identify publicly listed companies and all their 
directors
•• to identify large but apparently influential unlisted 
companies and all their directors
•• to identify parastatals with a role in business or econ-
omy, for example, Kenya Bureau of Standards, Kenya 
Tea Development Authority, Kenya Airports’ 
Authority, and so on and all their directors
•• to identify key business associations and all their 
directors
The Internet and telephone research was undertaken 
between September 2012 and July 2013.
Finding the directors of public limited companies (PLC) 
was relatively straightforward as the stock exchange lists 
public companies and every PLC lists its directors either 
directly on its website or else in its annual report. There are 
64 quoted companies in Kenya (see the list in the appendix). 
At the time of the research, there were 193 people holding 
213 directorships. Only 14 of them held more than one direc-
torship and only 5 held more than two directorships in other 
quoted companies. Some 19 of them also held 29 positions—
as director or trustee—of a parastatal organization. Two 
quoted companies still have a majority of their shares owned 
by the government either directly or through the National 
Social Security Fund.
There are a large number of parastatal organizations, but 
at the time of the research, there was no directory (though the 
government has subsequently published a list which has 47 
organizations but does not appear to be comprehensive). 
Some 44 have been identified, and it is believed that this 
includes all the ones that are likely to be influential, such as 
the Central Bank, the Tourist Board, the Kenya Investment 
Authority, and the Kenya Ports Authority (see the list in the 
appendix). As with PLCs, parastatals invariably have a web-
site and list their directors. At the time of the research, there 
were 289 people holding 325 directorships or trusteeships. 
Some 24 held more than one position and just 3 held more 
than two positions.
Among parastatals, most have just one director who is 
also on a company board. The exceptions are the Industrial 
Development Bank, the National Social Security Fund, the 
National Oil Corporation, and the Kenya Tourist Board. One 
can well see why they would want private sector expertise on 
their boards.
Some private companies are quite large, and it is possible 
that some directors are influential. The Kenya Business 
Directory (2013) says that there are around 89,000 compa-
nies in Kenya of which some 53,000 are based in Nairobi. 
There is a requirement for companies and their directors to 
be registered with the Companies Registry in the Attorney 
General’s office but the information is not publicly available, 
so there is no easy way to identify directors. One method by 
which people might seek to be noticed and then to wield 
influence is by becoming involved in business associations. 
It is also likely that people who are seeking to influence gov-
ernment might either be completely ignored or might be co-
opted by government by appointing them to the boards of 
parastatals.
It is estimated that there are around 380 formally regis-
tered business associations (BAF, 2013, p. 3) but that fewer 
than 15 have the resources to be sustainable (BAF, 2013, 
p. 10). Most BMOs do not publicize the names of their direc-
tors, so 19 BMOs (listed in the appendix) were surveyed by 
telephone and asked to name them. This generated a list of 
212 people, holding 222 directorships. Six of the ten who 
have a second directorship were representing their associa-
tion on the board of the apex, KEPSA. No one had more than 
two directorships.
The Findings
If our hypothesis is correct, one might have expected to see 
considerable overlap, but in fact there is very little. The 
Kenya Electricity Generating Company (known as KenGen) 
and the National Bank of Kenya (NBK) (both of which have 
a majority government stake) have several directors who are 
also on the board of parastatals (figure 3). Only two other 
companies, Mumias Sugar Company and Kenya Reinsurance 
Corporation, share more than one director with a parastatal. 
In the case of Mumias, they share a director with the Kenya 
Sugar Board and also have Joseph Kinyua on their board. 
Kenya Reinsurance Corporation shares directors with Kenya 
Airports Authority and the Industrial Development Bank—
and also has Joseph Kinyua on its board.
The person who stands out as being involved in a large 
number of boards is Joseph Kinyua who apparently found 
time to be on the boards of 10 parastatals (ranging from the 
Central Bank of Kenya to the Catering Tourism and Training 
Development Levy Trustees) and four quoted companies 
(though these are privatized businesses that were previously 
state-owned enterprises with the government still having a 
stake and thus wishing to appoint a director. At the time of 
the research, Kinyua was principal secretary (would be called 
permanent secretary in the United Kingdom) at the National 
Treasury (formerly the Ministry of Finance), though he has 
since been appointed as Head of the Public Service and Chief 
of Staff to the President. The laws creating a number of para-
statals specify that the Principal Secretary of the National 
Treasury will be a director and, in practice, he would send an 
alternate to most of the organizations.
It is striking that none of the business association direc-
tors are on the board of a parastatal or public company. Those 
directors on more than one board are shown in Figure 4, 
though it should be noted that this includes a small number 
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of directors whose BMO was not surveyed, but who are 
known to be directors (specifically Media Owners’ 
Association, Pyrethrum Growers’ Association, Agriculture 
Industry Network, Pubs Entertainment & Restaurants’ 
Association of Kenya, and EABC).
Most people represent a business but a very small number 
represent a ministry, implying a close relationship between 
the government and the BMO. Only 10 BMO directors (and 
two BMO chief executives) were directors of more than one 
BMO and in all cases but two, it seemed that they were rep-
resenting their own BMO on the board of the other—such as 
KEPSA or the recently formed Agriculture Industry Network, 
which is aiming to bring together the commodity farmers. 
One director is on the board of a parastatal (the Kenya Tea 
Development Agency) and another is on the board of the 
regional apex East Africa Business Council. Given that the 
survey did not cover all BMOs, it is possible that the sample 
is not representative. The Eastern Africa Association (EAA) 
represents inward investors and is regarded as sufficiently 
important by the government that they meet regularly with 
ministers. However, none of their board members are 
Kenyan; none appear to hold other positions in Kenya; and 
EAA aims to lobby as EAA. The Federation of Kenyan 
Employers refused to provide a list of its directors and many 
of its members are also in sectoral associations. The survey 
did cover, inter alia, KEPSA, KAM, the Kenya National 
Federation of Agricultural Producers (KENFAP), and the 
Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(KNCCI), so it is believed that most of the economy has been 
covered.
BMO staff and directors who participate in BAF training are 
encouraged to develop good networks with people at all levels 
in key ministries and to ensure that they communicate regularly 
with those people. And some of the BMOs, such as KAM, do 
seem to be well connected and are able to influence policy.
The feedback from participants in BAF training suggests 
that they perceive that others, with better networks, will be 
more effective. While there may be others with better net-
works, this research suggests that there are not many of them 
and reinforces the need for staff and directors of business 
associations to build good networks. Indeed, the Seed Trade 
Association of Kenya (STAK) recruited an ex-official from 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) to improve access to MoA 
officials.
Figure 3. Directors of both quoted companies and parastatals.
Note. Directors are shown the middle with private companies at the top of the figure and parastatal organisations at the bottom.
NSSF = National Social Security Fund.
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Business leaders do use their contacts: for example, Mike 
Macharia, CEO, Kenya Association of Hotelkeepers & 
Caterers (KAHC) explains that he went to school with many 
of the current ministers and so is able just to pick up the tele-
phone and talk to them (C. Davis, director, BAF, Nairobi, 
personal communication, July 19, 2013). Crucially, however, 
he is doing this on behalf of the member of the KAHC and 
not for the sole benefit of his own hotel.
KAM is probably the most influential BMO in Kenya and 
gives the impression of being well able to influence the govern-
ment. For those willing to make the effort, finding links through 
friends or friends of friends is possible, though perhaps not 
always easy. Milgram (1967) asserts that “any two people in 
the world, no matter how remote from each other, can be linked 
in terms of intermediate acquaintance” (p. 63). He concluded 
that, on average, only five intermediaries are needed to link any 
two people (usually described now as six degrees of separation, 
though he never used that description). He stressed, though, 
that this implies a “closeness” that may not exist and which 
cannot easily be exploited, presumably because of the diffi-
culty for most people in identifying a complete chain to the 
target and being sufficiently persuasive along the chain.
When appropriate, they ask directors to exploit their per-
sonal contacts (B. Maina, CEO, KAM, Nairobi, personal 
communication, July 18, 2013), though interestingly, KAM 
says that they see no evidence that those with personal con-
tacts have greater sway, partly because there is a lot of pri-
vate sector competition and no individual business has 
sufficient economic weight to make a difference on its own, 
and partly because ultimately decisions are made based on 
political interests. Friendship and networks open doors—and 
KAM’s positions are carefully considered because it is seen 
to be credible and representative (B. Maina, personal com-
munication, July 18, 2013). It is essential, however, to back 
up arguments with evidence, and KAM is good at doing that. 
Betty Maina, CEO, explains, “People don’t make decisions 
on emotion and conjecture.”
The support provided by BAF resulted in the publication 
by business associations of 52 research reports and policy 
position papers, 419 dialogues and consultations with gov-
ernment, the raising of 167 issues with government and 56 
changes to public policy (though not every change in policy 
has yet been implemented)—suggesting that associations are 
having some considerable success.
It is easy to assume that success is due to a combination of 
the private sector being able to make a convincing case for 
change and the public sector being willing to listen and then 
to act. This does of course require that the associations have 
Figure 4. Business association director overlap.
Note. Directors are shown at the top with business asssociations in the middle and bottom (where representatives of one association sit on the baord of 
another)
KNCCI = Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry; MOA = Ministry of Agriculture; AKI = Association of Kenya Insurers; KPDA = Kenya 
Property Developers’ Association; KBA = Kenya Bankers’ Association; KAM = Kenya Association of Manufacturers; EABC = East Africa Business Council; 
FPEAK = Fresh Produce Exporters’ Association; EATTA = East African Tea Traders’ Association; KEPSA = Kenya Private Sector Alliance; KSC = Kenya 
Shippers’ Council; KENFAP = Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers; KAHC = Kenya Association of Hotelkeepers & Caterers.
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access to the key policy makers. The evidence appears to 
suggest that associations that put in the effort to develop and 
maintain relationships are more likely to be successful in 
influencing public policy. This perhaps still begs a question 
about whether it is actually the association that has made the 
difference or whether it is specific members of staff or per-
haps members of the board who can “open doors” through 
their personal networks and connections. It also raises inter-
esting questions about the social capital of organizations and 
of individuals, whether there is a boundary separating busi-
ness association objectives from business leader objectives 
and transparency. In the case of associations, however, the 
social capital is largely the networks of contacts brought by 
staff and board from their experience elsewhere and through 
their ability to cultivate new contacts. Useem (1984) effec-
tively argues that it is the individuals who own the social 
capital and, furthermore, that they develop multiple connec-
tions through being part of the inner circle, which they are 
then able to exploit on behalf of a number of organizations. 
There is anecdotal evidence that school relationships endure 
into adulthood and a relatively small number of well- 
educated people, most of whom know each other, run the 
country and key institutions. And organizations such as 
Rotary are as popular in Kenya as they are in the West.
Conclusion
Some observers believe that there is an “inner circle” of key 
business leaders who are not only able to influence political 
leaders but also work hand in glove for mutual benefit with-
out concern for wider community benefit. It is not a given 
that large numbers of people who are influential will have 
multiple board memberships and in particular membership 
of both private and public boards, though Bennett (1998) 
believes it to be so. However, rising to the top of a private 
sector organization may suggest some respect from the pri-
vate sector and may increase the chance of appointment to a 
public body. If this is the case, it might be observable through 
the appointment of a small number of business leaders to a 
large number of public sector boards. Appointments to pub-
lic sector boards may also be designed to “capture” business 
leaders who would otherwise be “troublesome” in lobbying 
the policy makers. If there is an inner circle, the business 
leaders who comprise it are unlikely to admit to seeking to 
influence policy for private gain, so this research has taken a 
novel approach in looking for evidence that members of the 
inner circle are being appointed to positions, which would 
give them legitimacy to air their views and to support their 
assertions by gathering appropriate evidence.
It appears from the research, however, that very few peo-
ple are on more than one board—thus reducing good net-
working opportunities—but also suggesting that government 
appointments to parastatals are designed neither to provide 
cover to individual business leaders nor to bring BMO direc-
tors into the fold.
If Useem’s inner circle exists, then its members are hiding 
in the shadows. It is possible, indeed probable, that the old 
school tie and networking through other means does still 
determine who influences who. The local culture is impor-
tant, with members of society looking up to those who are 
successful. In a country such as Kenya, it is likely that eth-
nicity also helps. And it seems that there has been some 
influence achieved through corrupt practice (Wrong, 2009). 
There is no doubt that there are some people who are 
extremely well connected, and there seem to be a number of 
business people who seek political power, directly or indi-
rectly, or who seek government contracts via political con-
nections. However, the evidence suggests that there are not 
too many of them and that Useem’s inner circle, if it exists at 
all in Kenya, is very small. It is clear, however, that business 
leaders and BMO leaders talk regularly with each other and 
with key stakeholders (C. Davis, personal communication, 
July 19, 2013)—indeed BMOs should be encouraging this 
interaction—though it is perhaps less clear how much this 
adds to their ability to influence.
The conclusion perhaps is that staff and directors of busi-
ness associations need to be proactive in developing their 
own networks, which they can then exploit for the good of 
the association and of the private sector in general. This 
could be an interesting area for further research, not least as 
a logical consequence of effective networking would be that 
those working with business associations need to encourage 
them to become better at networking and building relation-
ships which they can then use to ensure that their views are 
given a fair hearing by policy makers.
Appendix
Publicly Quoted Companies
Source. www.crmz.com/Directory/CountryKE.htm; Nairobi 
Securities Exchange.
•• A.Baumann and Company Limited
•• AccessKenya Group Ltd
•• Athi River Mining Ltd
•• Bamburi Cement Limited
•• Barclays Bank of Kenya Limited
•• BOC Kenya Limited
•• British American Investment Company
•• British American Tobacco Kenya Limited
•• Car & General Ltd
•• Carbacid Investments Ltd
•• Centum Investment Company Ltd
•• CfC Stanbic Holdings Limited
•• CFC Insurance Holdings
•• City Trust Limited
•• CMC Holdings Limited
•• Crown Berger Kenya Limited
•• Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Ltd
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•• EAAGADS Limited
•• East African Breweries Ltd
•• East African Cables Limited
•• East African Packaging Industries Ltd
•• East African Portland Cement Co. Ltd
•• Equity Bank Limited
•• Eveready East Africa Limited
•• Express Kenya Limited
•• First American Bank of Kenya
•• Gulf African Bank
•• Housing Finance Company Limited
•• Hutchings Biemer Ltd
•• Jubilee Holdings Limited
•• Kakuzi Limited
•• Kapchorua Tea Company Limited
•• KenolKobil Ltd
•• Kenya Airways Limited
•• Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd
•• Kenya Electricity Generating Company
•• Kenya National Mills
•• Kenya Orchards Ltd
•• Kenya Reinsurance Corporation Limited
•• Limuru Tea Company Limited
•• Marshalls (East Africa) Limited
•• Mumias Sugar Company Limited
•• Nation Media Group
•• National Bank of Kenya Limited
•• NIC Bank Limited
•• Olympia Capital Holdings Ltd
•• Pan Africa Insurance Holdings Limited
•• Rea Vipingo Plantations Ltd
•• Safaricom Limited
•• Sameer Africa Ltd
•• Sasini Ltd
•• Scangroup Limited
•• Standard Chartered Bank Ltd
•• Cooperative Bank of Kenya Ltd
•• Kenya Power & Lighting Company Ltd
•• Standard Group Limited
•• Total Kenya Limited
•• TPS Eastern Africa Limited (TPSEAL)
•• Trans Century Ltd
•• Uchumi Supermarkets Limited
•• Unga Group Ltd
•• Unilever Tea Kenya Ltd
•• Williamson Tea Kenya Ltd
Parastatals
•• Agricultural Development Corporation
•• Agricultural Finance Corporation
•• Capital Markets Authority
•• Catering Tourism and Training Development Levy 
Trustees
•• Central Bank of Kenya
•• Coast Development Authority
•• Coffee Board of Kenya
•• Communication Commission of Kenya
•• East African Portland Cement Co.
•• Export Promotion Council
•• Horticultural Crops Development Authority
•• Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation
•• Industrial Development Bank
•• Investment Promotion Centre
•• Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
•• Kenya Airports Authority
•• Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
•• Kenya Broadcasting Corporation
•• Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS)
•• Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
•• Kenya Dairy Board
•• Kenya Industrial Property Institute
•• Kenya Industrial Research & Development Institute
•• Kenya Institute of Public Policy Research & 
Analysis
•• Kenya Investment Authority
•• Kenya National Assurance Company
•• Kenya Ports Authority
•• Kenya Post Office Savings Bank
•• Kenya Railways Corporation
•• Kenya Revenue Authority
•• Kenya Roads Board
•• Kenya Sugar Board
•• Kenya Tourist Board
•• Kenya Tourist Development Corporation
•• National Housing Corporation
•• National Oil Corporation of Kenya Ltd
•• National Social Security Fund (NSSF)
•• Postal Corporation of Kenya
•• Tea Board of Kenya
•• Telkom (k) Ltd
•• Water Resources Management Authority
•• Water Services Regulatory Board
Business Member Organizations (BMOs)
•• African Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum (ABSF)
•• Architectural Association of Kenya (ArchAK)
•• Association of Kenya Insurers (AKI)
•• East African Tea Traders’ Association (EATTA)
•• Federation of Women Entrepreneurs’ Associations 
(FEWA)
•• Fresh Produce Exporters’ Association (FPEAK)
•• Institution of Surveyors of Kenya (ISK)
•• Kenya Association of Hotelkeepers & Caterers 
(KAHC)
•• Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM)
•• Kenya Bankers’ Association (KBA)
•• Kenya Chamber of Mines (KCM)
•• Kenya Medical Women’s Association (KMWA)
•• Kenya National Chamber of Commerce & Industry 
(KNCCI)
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•• Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers 
(KENFAP)
•• Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA)
•• Kenya Property Developers’ Association (KPDA)
•• Kenya Shippers’ Council (KSC)
•• Kenya Transport Association (KTA)
•• Kenya Veterinary Association (KVA)
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